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SECTION 11 OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
REHABILITATION POTENTIAL AND SENTENCING
INTRODUCTION

Article I, section 11 of the 1970 Constitution is entitled "Limitation of Penalties After Conviction," and the first sentence of
that provision reads as follows:
All penalties shall be determined both according to the
seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the
offender to useful citizenship.

Section 11 of the Bill of Rights of the 1870 Constitution had
provided only that penalties should be proportioned to the offense. The question which the new language raises is whether,
under the 1970 Constitution, there is an enforceable right to have
the penalty proportioned to the offender as well as the offense.
Investigation of the history of constitutional limitations on penalties in Illinois, and of the debates concerning the new section
11, indicates that the creation of a new right was intended.
The evil which the provision seeks to remedy is an arbitrary
or capricious exercise of sentencing powers. The method chosen
by the delegates to protect against this evil was to draft a constitutional mandate providing two factors, seriousness of the offense and rehabilitation, which must be considered in any exercise of the legislative power of sentencing. The framers realized
that although the legislature specifies limits on the length of imprisonment -according to the offense, the crucial exercise of sentencing power is the penalty set by a judge within those limits.
It was the possibility of arbitrary sentencing by a "punitiveminded judge" which prompted the framers to include the language concerning rehabilitation.'
Section 11 was intended to place a direct constitutional limitation on a judge who is exercising those functions
of the legislative power of sentencing which have been delegated to the judicial branch. Failure of a judge to take rehabilitative possibilities into consideration is a violation of that limitation, and consequently, a violation of defendant's constitutional right under
section 11.
1. In a personal interview on September 13, 1974 with Mr. Elmer
Gertz, Chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee at the 1970 Constitutional Convention, Mr. Gertz stated that he felt the intention behind section 11 was "to place limitations on punitive-minded judges."
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LIMITATION OF PENALTIES UNDER THE

1870 CONSTITUTION

The investigation of 'any provision of a new constitution must
necessarily begin with a look backward toward its ancestral
foundation. Only by comparing the new provision with its predecessor can substantive changes be distinguished from the mere
rephrasing of an established constitutional doctrine.
The doctrine that the penalty should fit the crime can be
traced back to Magna Carta. 2 The delegates to the 1970 Constitutional Convention were aware of the fact that the eighth
amendment to the United States Constitution was based on the
tenth section of the English Bill of Rights.3 The 1818 and 1848
Illinois Constitutions also stated that penalties should be proportioned to the nature of the offense and added, "the true design
of all punishments [is] to reform, not to exterminate mankind."4
The Illinois Constitution of 1870 phrased the idea in the following
manner: "All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the
offense . .

.5

These provisions operated as limitations on the imposition
of penalties by the government. 6 Since state constitutions may
only limit the legislative branch and grant powers to the executive and judicial branches, 7 all these limitations on penalties were
presumably directed at the legislative branch. However, because
sentencing is so interwoven with the judicial process, one question which arose under the 1870 Constitution was whether the
courts, as well as the legislature, were limited by the provision
which provided that all penalties be proportioned to the offense.
The Supreme Court of Illinois first considered this question
in 1916 in People v. Elliot.8 The court said:
The provision is directed to the lawmaking power, which alone
can determine what acts shall be regarded as criminal and how
they shall be punished. 9
The court in Elliot further held that since article II, section 11
of the 1870 Constitution was binding only on the legislature, if
2. Chapter 20 of the Magna Carta reads:
A freeman shall not be ammenced for a small fault, but after the
manner of the fault, and for a great crime according to the heinousness of it ....
S.H.A. CONST. Magna Carta § 20.

3. G. BRADEN & D. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION:
AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 51 (1969) [hereinafter cited as BRADEN

& COHN]. This book was prepared specifically for use as a reference
by the delegates to the 1970 Constitutional Convention.
4. ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 14 (1818); ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 14
(1848).
5. ILL. CONST. art. II, § 11 (1870).
6. BRADEN & COHN, supra note 3, at 5.

7. See Field v. People ex rel. McClernand, 3 Ill. 79, 81 (1839).
8. 272 111. 592, 112 N.E. 300 (1916).
9. Id. at 599, 112 N.E. at 303.
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the penalty imposed was within the specified limits set by the
legislature, the penalty, itself, could not be attacked on a constitutional ground. Instead, the constitutionality of the statute
under which the penalty was imposed would have to be challenged. 10 A more precise statement of this principle was enunciated by the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Brickey.'1
In short, where a sentence is imposed within the limits of the
statute, as here, no constitutional question with respect to the
punishment being disproportionate can be involved by merely
assailing the sentence. It is necessary to attack the law, itself,
and show that it violates some specific provision 12of the State or
Federal constitution in order to raise the question.
One factor which probably contributed to this construction
was that until the 1960's the legislature had delegated relatively
few sentencing functions to the judicial branch. Until the enactment of the Criminal Code of 1960,'1 the authority to impose
a sentence within the statutory limitations, in most cases, rested
with the jury and not with the court. 4 A sentence fixed by
the trial court was not subject to appellate review, if within the
statutory limitations,' 5 until the Criminal Procedure Act of
196316 specifically granted such power. 17 Thus, for most of the
period during which the courts operated under the 1870 Constitution, there was no statutory authority to interfere with a validly
imposed sentence, no matter how harsh. This lack of judicial
power was specifically noted in People v. Smith, 8 in which the
court stated:
If the statute is not in violation of the constitution, then any
punishment assessed by a court or jury within the limits fixed
thereby cannot be adjudged excessive, for the reason that the
power to declare what punishment may be assessed against those
convicted of crimes is not a judicial power, but a legislative
power, controlled only by the provisions of the constitution.' 9
Because of the delegation of sentencing functions which occurred during the 1960's, the authority of judges to exercise the
legislative power of sentencing was greatly increased. Thus, it
is understandable that the drafters of section 11, at the 1970 Con10. Id. at 600, 112 N.E. at 304.
11. 396 Ill. 140, 71 N.E.2d 157 (1947).
12. Id. at 144, 71 N.E.2d at 160.
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1973) (originally enacted as Act of July
28, 1961, [1961] Ill. Laws 1983).
14. See, e.g., Act of May 29, 1943, ch. 38 § 754a [1943] Ill. Laws 589

(repealed 1961).

15.
16.
Act of
17.
as Act
18.

People v. Dudgeon, 341 Ill. App. 553, 94 N.E.2d 556 (1950).
(originally enacted as
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 100 et seq. (1973)
Aug. 14, 1963, [19631 Ill. Laws 2836).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. llOA, § 615(b) (4) (1973) (originally enacted
of Aug. 14, 1963 ch. 38, § 121-9(4) [1963] Ill. Laws 2877).
245 Ill. App. 119 (1923).

19. Id. at 123 (emphasis added).
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stitutionial Convention, assumed that an effective provision limiting penalties must directly limit the judicial branch in its exer20
cise of sentencing powers.
DEBATES CONCERNING ARTICLE I, SECTION 11
OF THE 1970 CONSTITUTION
ProposalsBefore the Convention
Proposal #f1 of the Bill of Rights Committee did not contain
the language concerning restoration to useful citizenship. 21 That
language had been proposed, but the committee voted 7 to 5 to
retain, unchanged, section 11 of the Bill of Rights of the 1870
Constitution.2 2 On the floor of the convention, Delegate Foster
reintroduced the language concerning rehabilitation by proposing
the following amendment:
All penalties shall be proportioned both to the nature of the
offense and to the objective of restoring the offender to useful
citizenship and the basis of such
penalties shall be explained by
23
the court and subject to review.
After debate, the requirement of explanation of the basis for
penalties and providing for review was deleted by the Lennon
Amendment to the Foster Amendment. 24 The delegates believed
that to require a written reason for imposing a sentence was to
constitutionalize something unheard of before, that is, the forced
rendering of written opinions from the judicial branch. 25 Sec-i
ond, it was thought that since the power of review had already
been statutorily granted, such language would merely be re26
dundant.
20. See text accompanying note 24 infra where Delegate Kamin's
question was not whether section 11 was binding on the courts, but
whether it was also binding on the legislature.
21. REc. OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILL. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Committee Proposals, vol. VI at 10 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as
Committee Proposals].
22. Id. at 45.
23. REC. OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILL. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION Verbatim Transcripts, vol. III at 1391 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as
Verbatim Transcripts].
24. Verbatim Transcripts,vol. III at 1394.
25. Id. at 1392.
26. Id. at 1395. The transcripts reveal that Mr. Lennon's only purposes were to avoid being redundant and to avoid placing the burden
of a written opinion on a trial judge. After stating that he did not quarrel with the principle that a sentence should be reviewable to determine
if any bias or persecution was involved, Delegate Lennon stated his objection to the requirement of a written opinion in the following manner:
But I am quarreling, I think, with the proposition that a judge, in
carrying out this feature of a trial and this feature of a conviction,
must in detail explain every inch of the way what he has done with
respect to the penalty.
Verbatim Transcripts,vol. III at 1395.
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Statements Concerning Purpose
One method of discerning the intended purpose of the proposed changes is 'an examination of the statements of the proponent of the amendment.
MR. FOSTER: Mr. President and fellow members, the purpose
of this amendment is to clarify the constitutional language with
regard to penalties. Traditionally the constitution has stated
that a penalty should be proportionate to the nature of the offense. I feel that with all we've learned about penology that
somewhere along the line we ought to indicate that in addition
to looking to the act that the person committed, we also should
look at the person who committed the act and27determine to what
extent he can be restored to useful citizenship.
It -appears that Mr. Foster's purpose was to create an additional
factor to be considered when the constitutionality of a penalty
is questioned. The issue then arises whether this additional requirement was intended to create a new legal right with a correlative duty, or whether it merely constituted an overture to
those governmental bodies who determine penalties to be cognizant of the possibility of rehabilitation. In short, was the language intended to be substantive or hortatory?
The delegates were aware that, in at least one instance, a
penalty had been struck down as being violative of the 1870 provision. 2 8 Therefore, section 11 of the 1870 Constitution had been
construed as creating an enforceable right to have the penalty
proportioned to the offense.
The new section 11 employed basically the same language,
while adding the language concerning rehabilitation. Use of the
word "shall" indicates that the requirement concerning rehabilitation is mandatory rather than permissive. If a permissive construction had been intended, the wording of this proposal could
easily have been changed so as to reflect a contrast in treatment
between the requirement of proportionment to the offense and
proportionment to the offender, such as by stating "shall be proportioned to the offense and may be determined with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship." Instead, the
mandatory word "shall" in the present provision refers to both
requirements. It would seem then, that the intent of the framers
of this provision was that a penalty might be successfully challenged as unconstitutional for failing to consider the objective
of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.
27. Id. at 1391.
28. See BRADEN & COHN 52 which contains a discussion of Chicago
& A.R.R. v. People ex rel. Koerner, 67 Ill. 11 (1873).
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A question and answer exchange between Delegates Hendren
and Foster provides -additional insight into the meaning of the
Foster Amendment.
MR. HENDREN: I would like to ask Delegate Foster a couple of
questions. Leonard, specifically what does the word "propor-

tion" mean in your amendment and, secondly, does this mean
that major emphasis will be placed upon rehabilitation?
MR. FOSTER: I am not sure how-in terms of "proportion" it
means that the more serious the crime, the more serious the
punishment; and, also, in deciding what punishment to impose,
the court would do that which with regard to this particular
convicted person is most likely to get him back into useful citizenship.
It means that they can't just take rules of thumb and apply them
willy-nilly, but they have to look at each situation rather carefully, applying whatever standards are developed.
Now what was your second question?
MR. HENDREN: Would major emphasis be placed upon rehabilitation?
MR. FOSTER: I would hope so. At least some emphasis would
have to be placed on rehabilitation under this provision.
Now, of course, probably there would be worked out by the
legislature and by rules of court just where the emphasis would
lie. This is a pretty wide open statement here. It's just a statement of sentiment, almost, on the part of the Convention. I
would hope, though, that it would lead to the major thrust being
towards rehabilitation rather than just punishment. 29
The remark that the statement is just one of "sentiment"
might initially appear to indicate that the statement was,
indeed, intended to be hortatory. However, by qualifying "sentiment" with the world "almost," Delegate Foster indicated that
although rehabilitative factors were to be considered as constitu:
tional requirements, at the same time, the provision was purposely left broad enough to allow the development of standards by'
the legislature and the courts.
Assuming that a new constitutional limitation was intended,
the question 'arises as to whether it applied only to the legislature
in the same manner in which the 1870 provision was interpreted,
or whether it was also intended to bind the courts in their exercise of the legislative power of sentencing. An exchange between
Delegates Kamin and Foster gives some insight:
MR. KAMIN: I am curious. Is it contemplated that the requirement is directed to the legislature as well as to the court and is
the legislation Which provides a penalty subject to challenge
under this provision? That's my first question. My second
29. Verbatim Transcripts,vol. III at 1392.
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question is, if a judge is within the range of penalties prescribed
by the legislature and if the legislation passes the test, hasn't
the judge passed the test with regard to the proportion?
My third question is, what is viewed as the remedy upon
review when a reviewing court is reviewing the socalled [sic]
basis of such penalties? Is the penalty voided because the reason
wasn't good enough or does the penalty stand until a better
reason is given? What do you contemplateMR. FOSTER: As to the first question, as I remember it, yes,
this would be binding on the legislature.
As to the second question. I would presume that in order for
this provision to be effectuated there would have to be rules
adopted by the courts, but where the legislature provides a
range-say, five to twenty for a given offense-even if the
judge is within the range under this provision, I would expect
him to somehow justify picking either the five or the twenty.
Now that was twoMR. KAMIN: My third question was the remedy.
MR. FOSTER: The remedy I would think on review would be
that the reviewing court could either reduce the penalty or set
30
the man free.
It is apparent from this exchange, and indeed from the language
of the Foster Amendment before amended by the Lennon
Amendment, that this proposal was drafted on the assumption
that it was binding on the courts as well as the legislature.
An attempt to limit the judiciary in any manner
would seem
to contradict the well-established principle that state constitutions only limit legislatures and grant powers to the judicial
and executive branches. 31 Section 11, however, was not intended
to limit the judiciary in the exercise of its constitutionally
granted powers or of its inherent powers. It was intended to
limit judges in their exercise of the legislative powers of sentencing which had been delegated to them by statute. 32 In view of
the wide latitude given to judges by statute to determine sentences, it is easy to see why the delegates assumed that an effective constitutional limitation on penalties must bind the
courts.
Since section 11 was intended to directly limit the judicial
exercise of sentencing powers, it would logically follow that a
disregard of this limitation by the judiciary would raise a constitutional question. In fact, the most interesting part of the
above exchange is how closely Mr. Kamin's second question, concerning the situation where a judge is within the range of statutorily permitted penalties, parallels the question raised by cases
30. Id. at 1393.
31. See Field v. People ex rel. McClernand, 3 Ill. 79 (1839).
32. See text accompanying notes 39-43 infra.
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such as People v. Smith3 3 underthe 1870 Constitution.
The interpretation of the 1870 Constitution in Smith is consistent with Mr. Kamin's suggestion that if a judge has passed
a sentence within the range of penalties prescribed by the legislature, he has passed the constitutional test. Note however, that
Mr. Foster, .the proponent of the 1970 provision, would disagree,
and under the new provision, require justification for the sentence picked within the statutory range. The point of the analogy is that since the 1870 provision was aimed solely at the legislature, no constitutional issue could be raised by attacking a sentence as excessive, provided that the court had acted within the
limits prescribed by the legislature; in contrast, the 1970 provision, which was aimed at the courts as well as the legislature,
would arguably allow a defendant to raise a constitutional issue
,as to the validity of the sentence, even though it was within the
statutory limits, on the grounds -that the court had failed .to
comply with the language of section 11.
The final wording of the first sentence of section 11 was
changed twice, both times by the Committee on Style, Drafting,
and Submission, before adoption by the convention.3 4 Although
that committee was not supposed to make any substantive
changes, it is interesting to note that the word "proportioned"
was supplanted by the word "determined. '3 5 The word "deter33. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
34. The first change was to strike the words "both" and "to" and add
the words "determined with" so that the sentence then read:
All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense
and determined with the objective of restoring the offender to useful
citizenship.
Committee Proposals, vol. VI at 212. The explanation of this change
was: "It does not make sense to talk of penalties being 'proportioned'
to the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. What is
intended is that penalties be determined with that objective." Committee Proposals,vol. VI at 219.
The second change was made by Proposal 15 of the Committee on
Style, Drafting, and Submission, and included no explanation since none
was thought necessary. The sentence was changed to read as it now
appears in the constitution:
All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender
to useful citizenship.
Committee Proposals,vol. VII at 2435 (emphasis added).
The intent of this change, however, can be found in a comment made
by Mr. Whalen when explaining Proposal 15 to the Convention:
[T]he purpose of the change was to insure that both factors must
be taken into account and also to prevent any possible interpretation
that this section was meant to abolish the death penalty.
Verbatim Transcripts,vol. V at 4238 (emphasis added).
35. A comparison of dictionary definitions of the two words demonstrates their differences:
Proportion: to make the parts of harmonious or correspondent or
symmetrical.
Determine: to come to a decision concerning as the result of investigation or reasoning.
WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTioNARY 1819, 616 (unabridged
1971).
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mine" was the verb chosen by the legislature when it delegated
power to the court to decide penalties,36 and the use of it is another indication that the true intent of section 11 was to place
limits on the exercise of such power.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 11
OF THE 1970 CONSTITUTION
Standardsfor Reduction of Sentence on Appeal
The most obvious use of a constitutional provision which
places limits on penalties is to attack a sentence as being constitutionally excessive. However, because the legislature had previously enacted statutes addressing the problem of excessive
sentences, section 11 did not cause a sudden change in this area
of the law. An investigation of the standards used to decide
questions of reduction of sentence reveals what effect section 11
has had on judicial proceedings concerning excessive sentences.
The Criminal Code of 196137 stated as one of its objectives
the prescription of penalties which were not only proportionate
to the crime but which recognized differences in rehabilitation
possibilities.88 The new criminal code also provided that upon
conviction the court should determine and impose the penalty. 9
To implement the court's power to determine the sentence, the
Code provided for a mandatory hearing in aggravation and miti40
gation and set forth guidelines which the court could consider.
These guidelines are evidence of the offender's moral character,
41
life, family, occupation and criminal record.
In 1963, the Criminal Code of Procedure 42 granted reviewing
courts the power to reduce the punishment imposed by the trial
court. 43 The reviewing courts, mindful of the statutory guide36. Act of July 28, 1961, ch. 38, § 1-7(b) [1961] Ill. Laws 1988 (re-

pealed 1973):

(b) Determination of Penalty. Upon conviction, the court shall determine and impose the penalty in the manner and subject to the
limitations imposed in this Section. (emphasis added).

(subject matter currently covered by ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-4-1 (b)
(1973)).
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1973) (originally enacted as Act of July

28, 1961 [1961] Ill. Laws 1983).
38. id. § 1-2(c).

39. Act of July 28, 1961, ch. 38, § 1-7(b) [1961] Ill. Laws 1988 (repealed 1974, subject matter currently covered by ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,

§ 1005-4-1(b) (1973)).
40. Act of July 28, 1961, ch. 38, § 1-7(g) [1961] 111. Laws 1989 (repealed 1974, subject matter currently covered by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 1005-3-2(a) & § 1005-4-1(a) (1973)).

41. Id.
42. ILL. REV.

STAT. ch. 38, § 100 et seq. (1973) (originally enacted as
Act of Aug. 14, 1963, [1963] Ill. Laws 2836).
43. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A § 615(b) (4) (1973) (originally enacted
as Act of Aug. 14, 1963, ch. 38, § 121-9(4) [1963] Ill. Laws 2877).
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lines set up for trial courts in the Criminal Code of 1961, apparently have chosen to adopt those standards in cases where
sentences determined by the trial court were challenged as excessive.
A good example of the appellate court's adoption of such sentencing guidelines, prior to the 1970 Constitution, is the case of
People v. Evrard.44 There, after citing the new power of review
granted the court by the Criminal Procedure Act of 196345' and
the provisions of the Criminal Code of 1961 establishing sentencing guidelines, 4 6 the court affirmed the conviction but remanded
with directions. The lower court was directed to take evidence
concerning the defendant's moral character, life, family, occupation and criminal record and to impose a punishment taking into
consideration such evidence.4 7 On remand, the defendant and his
wife testified as to defendant's employment, marital situation,
age, education, service record and prior criminal record. 48 Defendant was then sentenced to five years of probation, with a
condition that the first six months of such period be spent in
a penitentiary. 49 On appeal from that portion of the sentence
providing for six months in the penitentiary, the appellate court
held that the trial court had given full and adequate consideration to the appellate court's directions on remand,50 and that
since it did not appear that the trial judge was influenced by
anything but a desire to do what was fair and reasonable under
the circumstances, the new sentence should be affirmed. 51 Thus,
by the time the 1970 Constitution became effective, the appellate
courts had had almost seven years in which to work out rules
applicable to the implementation of their power to reduce sentences. The broad language of section 11 regarding consideration
of rehabilitative possibilities did not interject any new guidelines
for the appellate courts to follow, nor did its language indicate
that the guidelines already in use were inadequate to meet the
new constitutional limitations.
The appellate courts, therefore, continued to apply the rules
developed in the period after the 1963 Criminal Code of Procedure and before the 1970 Constitution, while adding references
to section 11 as constitutional support for their actions on questions of excessiveness of sentence. Representative of cases applying the statutory guidelines and using section 11 as authority
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

55 Ill. App. 2d 270, 204 N.E.2d 777 (1965).
Id. at 274, 204 N.E.2d at 779.
Id.
Id. at 276-77, 204 N.E.2d at 780.
65 Ill. App. 2d 118, 119-20, 212 N.E.2d 305, 306 (1965).
Id. at 121, 212 N.E.2d at 306.
Id. at 125, 212 N.E.2d at 308.
Id. at 128, 212 N.E.2d at 310.
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is the case of People v. Helms. 52 There the court reduced a sentence of 5 to 8 years for involuntary manslaughter to 2 to 6 years,
citing section 11 and basing its conclusion "primarily on the
factors that the [d] efendant had no prior record, maintained his
family life, was steadily and gainfully employed, and exhibited
'53
positive interest in the community.
The statutory guidelines discussed above and the judicial interpretations of them are not limitations on the possible scope
of judicial action under section 11. Although the statutory
guidelines are still valid, the intention of the framers of section
11 was that the court determine penalties with a view toward
restoring the offender to useful citizenship. The courts, therefore, should be free to develop whatever standards they deem are
necessary in order to comply with the mandate of section 11.
An investigation of those cases which specifically recognize the
mandate of section 11 exemplifies judicial efforts to establish
such guidelines.
In People v. Towns, 54 the court held that a sentence of 1
to 9 years for theft was not consistent with the mandate of section 11, relying on the usual factors of youth and lack of prior
criminal acts plus the facts that defendant "admittedly had a
poor environment, . . .showed remorse for his offense, and .. .
had applied for a night school adult education program and a
position in a manpower training course in auto mechanics. ...
Towns demonstrates that at least one court considers a defendant's environment and attitude to be important indications of his
rehabilitative possibilities.
56
The cases of People v. Griffin.
and People v. Roddy 57 indicate that the court will examine the length of the original sentence to determine whether or not the possibility of rehabilitation has been considered. In Griffin, a sentence of 6 to 14 years
for forgery was held not to make "provisions for the possibility
of rehabilitation 5 8 and was reduced to 2 to 6 years, considering
as a factor "the possibility that his criminal behavior may stem
from emotional difficulties which might be corrected with proper
59
care when he was institutionalized.
52. 133 Ill. App. 2d 727, 272 N.E.2d 228 (1971). See also People v.
Moore, 133 Ill. App. 2d 827, 272 N.E.2d 270 (1971), where the court cited
section 11 and noted substantially the same factors as in Helms, plus

the fact that defendant was unarmed and no violence was involved. Defendant's sentence for burglary was reduced from 3 to 10 years to 1 to
3 years.
53. 133 Ill. App. 2d at 734-35, 272 N.E.2d at 233.
54. 3 Ill. App. 3d 710, 279 N.E.2d 60 (1971).
55. Id. at 712, 279 N.E.2d at 61.
56. 8 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 290 N.E.2d 620 (1972).
57. 9 Ill. App. 3d 65, 291 N.E.2d 264 (1972).
58. 8 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 1072, 290 N.E.2d 620, 622 (1972).

59. Id.
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In Roddy, where the only substantial question on appeal was
the excessiveness of the sentence, the appellate court reduced
a sentence of 10 to 30 years for burglary to 3 to 9 years. The
decision is interesting in that it was evidently based solely on
defendant's age and the possibility of his rehabilitation. The sentence was reduced, even though at the time of his conviction he
had been on parole from a prison conviction for burglary, and
the conviction under consideration was his third for that crime.6 0
Citing the case of People v. Lilly 6 for the proposition that excessive sentences defeat the effectiveness of the parole system,
the court decided that the sentence imposed by the trial court
would, as a practical matter, leave no room for rehabilitation of
62
the 23 year-old defendant.
A striking example of the court's attempt to implement the
required consideration of rehabilitative factors is the case of
People v. Dandridge.63 In Dandridge, it appeared that defendant
was the organizer of an armed robbery, that he had viciously
and wantonly struck the lady manager of a market on the head
with his pistol, that he had violated parole from a theft sentence,
and had escaped from jail while being held on the present charge.
On appeal, defendant's sentence was modified to provide a minimum of 10 years, instead of 14, while the maximum of 28 years
was upheld. 64 The court, after reasoning that this reduction was
necessary to provide a reasonable possibility of rehabilitation,
stated that "this conclusion is not reached as a substitute for
the judgment of the trial court, but rather as a search for appropriate action under the constitutional direction."6 At least
one enlightened court of review, therefore, has explicitly recognized its own constitutional duty to protect the new right created
by section 11, even in the absence of facts meeting the previously
adopted statutory standards.
Representative of cases in which reduction of a sentence was
not granted is People v. Vega,66 where the court held that a sentence of 3 to 9 years for involuntary manslaughter "does not constitute a great departure from the spirit and purpose of the fundamental law or.

.

. [violate] section 11 of article I of the Con-

stitution of Illinois, which requires all punishment to be proportional to the offense. ' 67 The court was either unaware of, or
chose to ignore, the facts that the word "proportional" no longer
60. 9 Ill. App. 3d at 65-66, 291 N.E.2d at 264.
61. 79 Il. App. 2d 174, 223 N.E.2d 716 (1967).

62. 9 Ill. App. 3d at 66, 291 N.E.2d at 265.

63. 9 111. App. 3d 174, 292 N.E.2d 51 (1973).
64. Id. at 176, 292 N.E.2d at 52.
65. Id.

66. 16 Ill. App. 3d 504, 306 N.E.2d 718 (1973).
67. Id. at 509, 306 N.E.2d at 722.
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appeared in section 11, and that the consideration of rehabilitation
had been added.
The 1974 case of People v. Robinson6 8 cited as authority the
1965 Illinois Supreme Court case of People v. Taylor 9 and refused to reduce defendant's 5 to 15 year sentence upon conviction
for-deviate sexual assault. The court in Taylor had announced
the following standard to be used in the application of the appellate courts' statutory power to reduce sentences:
[W]here it is contended that the punishment imposed in a par:'ticular case is excessive, though within the limits prescribed by
the legislature, this court should not disturb the sentence unless
it clearly appears that the penalty constitutes a great departure
from the fundamental law and its spirit and purpose, or that the
penalty is manifestly in excess of the prescription of section 11
all
of article II of the Illinois Constitution which requires that
70
penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.
The date of the Taylor case, as well as the fact that the new
section 11 is contained in article I of the 1970 Constitution (as
opposed to section 11 of article II of the 1870 Constitution),
should have alerted the court in Robinson to the fact that they
were applying a rule promulgated under the 1870 Constitution.
An investigation of the validity of the Taylor standard was
made by a more perceptive court in People v. Knox. 7 1 There,
after acknowledging that the Supreme Court of Illinois in People
V. Taylor had set out guidelines to be used when applying Supreme Court Rule 615 (b) (which grants the power to review sentences), the court took notice of the change in language between
article II, section 11 of the 1870 Constitution and article I, section
11 of the 1970 Constitution. 72 The court concluded:
Potential rehabilitation, always a matter to be considered
at the time of sentencing, has been afforded specific recognition
by virtue of the section quoted above. We are of the opinion
the guidelines previously expressed
that such recognition extends
73
by our Supreme Court.
The court in Knox would seem to have correctly concluded that
in addition to being bound by guidelines of the Supreme Court
of. Illinois pertaining to that court's statutorily authorized rules,
it is also bound by the constitutional mandate found in section
11 that sentences be determined both according to the seriousness
of-the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender
to useful citizenship.
* 68. 18 Ill. App. 3d 360, 309 N.E.2d 757 (1974).

69.
70.
95, 150
71.

33 Ill. 2d 417, 211 N.E.2d 673 (1965).
Id. at 424, 211 N.E.2d at 677, quoting People v. Smith, 14 Ill. 2d
N.E.2d 815 (1958).
3 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 280 N.E.2d 10 (1972).

72. Id. at 1053-54, 280 N.E.2d at 13.
73. Id. at 1054, 280 N.E.2d at 13.
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When the period which spans both sides of the adoption of
the 1970 Constitution is investigated, the following conclusions
can be drawn with regard to the question of reduction of sentence on appeal. Because of pre-1970 Constitution changes in
statutory law, and the adoption by the appellate court of those
changes, the reduction of a sentence on appeal has not been significantly altered by the new section 11. Rather, as has been
demonstrated, the courts of review in Illinois have adopted previous guidelines concerning the question of reduction of sentence
and have used section 11 of article I of the 1970 Constitution
as new and strong authority to support their actions.
The basic effect of section 11 has been to give the appellate
courts an opportunity to develop new standards to implement
the mandate of section 11. The Supreme Court of Illinois has
not yet provided the appellate courts with any assistance in their
efforts to establish such guidelines. In the absence of such assistance, the appellate courts will continue in their task of searching for standards with which to implement the mandate of section 11.
Use of Section 11 as a Challenge
to Sentencing Rules
Another method of utilizing section 11 is to challenge existing sentencing statutes and rules as being unconstitutional because of the new requirement that each offender's possible restoration to useful citizenship be considered. Although the new
Uniform Code of Corrections7 4 was enacted after section 11 became effective, it carried forward much of the prior law concerning sentencing and therefore was still vulnerable to attack. The
Supreme Court Rules concerning sentencing were enacted before
the 1970 Constitution became effective and therefore they were
also an obvious target.
In the case of People ex rel. Ward v. Moran,75 the Illinois
Supreme Court considered an action for mandamus brought by
the State's Attorney of Christian County seeking to compel respondent, an appellate court judge of the fifth district, to vacate
that portion of his judgment which reduced defendant's sentence
from imprisonment in the penitentiary to probation. After rejecting the argument by the respondents (the defendant was also
a respondent) that Supreme Court Rule 615(b) 76 empowers a
court of review to reduce a penitentiary sentence imposed by
74. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1000-1 et seq. (1973).
75. 54 Ill. 2d 552, 301 N.E.2d 300 (1973).
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 615 (b) (1973).
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a trial court to one of probation, the supreme court considered
7
respondents' argument concerning section 11. 7
It was argued that since section 11 mandates that penalties
be determined with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship, probation was proper in this case since it was
the only method, under these facts, which could restore the defendant to useful citizenship. 78 The supreme court found the
argument to be unpersuasive and, after quoting in italics the language concerning rehabilitation, stated:
There is no indication that the italicized portion of section
11 is to be given greater consideration than that which establishes that the seriousness of the offense shall determine the
penalty. Nor does section 11 specifically empower a reviewing
court to grant probation
after the trial court has imposed a peni79
tentiary sentence.
Denying the writ of mandamus but utilizing its supervisory
authority, 0 the supreme court directed the appellate court to vacate that portion of its judgment granting probation and to specifically reconsider whether the trial court exercised its discretion
or acted arbitrarily in denying probation."' In effect, the court
held that section 11, standing by itself, does not guarantee every
defendant the right to probation.8 2 Rather, it guarantees that
each defendant will be sentenced with both of the requirements
of section 11 in mind, and not arbitrarily.
Sections 1005-8-4(f) and (g) of the new Uniform Code of Corrections 3 provide that sentences imposed for crimes committed
while confined, or during an escape or attempt to escape, shall
not commence until the expiration of the term under which the
offender is being held. In People v. Hudson,8 4 the appellate
court upheld consecutive sentences imposed upon offenders who
had been convicted of aggravated battery and escape from the
penitentiary.8 5 The court made the following reply to the defendants' contention that such sentencing violated section 11 and
that the statute8 6 was therefore unconstitutional:
The new Constitution does not require the abolition of consecutive sentences. To do so would be to tie the hands of the
courts and the legislature and render them powerless to impose
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

54 Ill. 2d 552, 556, 301 N.E.2d 300, 301 (1973).
Id., 301 N.E.2d at 302.
Id. at 556-57, 301 N.E.2d at 302.
ILL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 16 (1970).
54 Ill. 2d at 557, 301 N.E.2d at 303.
Id. at 554, 301 N.E.2d at 301.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-8-4(f) & (g) (1973).
84. 11 Ill. App. 3d 147, 296 N.E.2d 40 (1973).
85. The cases of three defendants, one of whom was convicted of aggravated battery and the other two who were convicted of escape from
the penitentiary, were consolidated on appeal because they all raised the
same issue, id. at 147, 296 N.E.2d at 41.
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-8-4(f) & (g) (1973).
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punishment upon one who commits a crime which (sic) incarcerated. Without a consecutive sentence then, except in the unusual cases such as where the prisoner has only a short time remaining on the sentence under which he is confined, the court
Ill. Rev. Stat.,
could not really punish him. Thus, we find that
87
ch. 38, par. 1005-8-4(f) and (g) is constitutional.
The Uniform Code of Corrections also carried forward the
prior practice of fixing minimum terms of imprisonment for certain crimes. Such statutes were an obvious target of attack via
section 11 since most had been enacted prior to the adoption of
the 1970 Constitution.
In People v. Cantrell,8" the Appellate Court of the First District decided to consider defendant's claim that the statute imposing a minimum sentence of 14 years for murder was unconstitutional, even though defendant had failed to properly raise
that issue at trial.8 9 Defendant contended that such a statute violated section 11 in that it prevented the court from tailoring the
sentence to fit the personal attributes of the offender.9 0 After
a review of the Verbatim Transcripts of the Constitutional Convention, the court held that the intention of the delegates was
that the legislature be required to develop sentencing standards
that reflected the goal of restoring the offender to useful citizenship, as well as providing a penalty that was proportionate to
the nature of the offense. 91 Thus, the court concluded that since
the legislature still had power to make judgments with respect
to criminal penalties, those judgments should not be overturned
and the statutory minimum of 14 years for the crime of murder
92
was constitutional.
This interpretation of section 11 is consonant with the intention of the framers. While the framers intended to place limits
upon the legislature as well as the courts, there is no indication
that they intended to alter the distribution of the power of sentencing between the courts and the legislature.
As the above cases indicate, constitutional challenges via section 11 have not been successful. This is not surprising when
the types of challenges involved are analyzed. In all the cases
except Moran, the challenges were to statutes enacted by the
legislature. Courts have always avoided declaring statutes. unconstitutional unless a clear violation of a recognized constitutional provision was present. Although section 11 does create
87. 11 Ill. App. 3d 147, 149, 296 N.E.2d 40, 42 (1973).
88. 14 Ill. App. 3d 1068 304 N.E.2d 13 (1973).
89. Id. at 1070-71, 304 N.E.2d at 15.
90. Id. at 1071, 304 N.E.2d at 16.
91. Id. at 1072, 304 N.E. 2d at 16.
92. Id. See also People v. Moore, 15 Ill. App. 3d 691, 304 N.E.2d 696
(1973), where using similar reasoning the court upheld the 4 year minimum sentence for the crime of rape, id. at 693, 304 N.E.2d at 698.
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a new constitutional right, it was not clear that the statutes attacked were in violation of the new right. Therefore, the courts
continued to avoid censoring the legislature by declaring a questionable law invalid.
THE PROCEDURAL EFFECTS OF SECTION 11

Implicit in the creation of a new constitutional right are the
procedural aspects of that right. Statutes enacted prior to 1970
had required the possibility of rehabilitation to be considered in
determining sentences. 9 3 Section 11 elevated those requirements
to constitutional status. Theoretically then, if the Illinois legislature repealed every law which made rehabilitation a consideration in the sentencing procedure, section 11 would still compel
the courts to take into consideration the possibility of returning
an offender to useful citizenship.
The elevation of this right, from statutory to constitutional
status, has other important procedural implications. First, although there is no right to a direct appeal from the trial court
to the Illinois Supreme Court in cases presenting constitutional
issues, such cases are more likely to eventually be heard in that
court.9 4 Second, the procedures of the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act 95 are available only upon the showing of a denial of a constitutional right.
The procedural effectiveness of section 11 depends upon
whether or not a substantial constitutional question is raised
when a defendant contends that a court has failed to act within
the limitations prescribed by section 11. In short, may the actions of a judge alone, in refusing to consider rehabilitation as
a factor in sentencing, violate a defendant's right under section
11? This certainly seems to have been the intent of the framers.9 6 The answer to the question, however, depends upon
whether section 11 is determined to be self-executing.
Section 11: A Self-Executing Provision?
Whether a constitutional provision is self-executing is of crit93. See Act of July 28, 1961, ch. 38, § 1-7(g) [1961] Ill. Laws 1989
(repealed 1973, subject matter currently covered by ILL. RIv. STAT. ch.
38, §§ 1005-3-2(a) & 1005-4-1 (a) (1973)).
94. Supreme Court Rule 603 provides that all criminal case appeals
shall be taken to the appellate court except in cases in which a death
sentence was imposed or a federal or state statute was held invalid, in
which case the appeal is directly to the supreme court. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110A, § 603 (1973). If a constitutional issue is raised, however, the
supreme court is more likely to exercise its discretion and allow an appeal from the appellate court because such a question would be of "general importance." See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 315(a) (1973).
95. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 et seq. (1973).

96. See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
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ical importance to the determination of how a constitutional
question may be raised. A constitutional provision is self-executing if no legislation is necessary to give it effect.9 7 Breach of
a statute, the purpose of which is to implement a constitutional
right, does not per se raise a constitutional question.9" Therefore, if section 11 is not self-executing, but instead requires legislation to implement it, the actions of a judge which violate such
legislation would not raise a constitutional question.
The fact that section 11 is mandatory in its language does
not preclude a construction that it is not self-executing.99 In
Tuttle v. National Bank, 0 0 the Supreme Court of Illinois held
that the determining factor, as to the question of self-execution,
is the intention behind the provision. 10
The intention which is determinative of the question of selfexecution is whether the provision was intended to be directed
to the courts or to the legislature.' 0 2 The portion of section 11
requiring proportionment to the offense was interpreted, under
the 1870 Constitution, to be directed to the legislature. 0 3 The
new language of section 11, concerning restoration to useful citizenship, was intended to be directed to the courts.10 4 Since a
constitutional provision may be self-executing in part and not
so in another part, 1 5 it is consistent to conclude that the rehabilitation language of section 11 is self-executing, while the
language concerning proportionment to the offense is not.
If the purpose of a constitutional provision would be frustrated unless it is given immediate effect, it should be held to
be self-executing. 0 6 Since the intended purpose of the language concerning restoration to useful citizenship was to limit
the judicial exercise of the sentencing power as delegated by the
legislature, that portion of section 11 should be held self-executing. If this construction of section 11 is adopted, then the failure
of a judge to act within the limitations prescribed by section 11
concerning rehabilitation as a factor in sentencing would be a
direct violation of a defendant's constitutional right, and would
raise a question of constitutional magnitude.
Appeals to the Supreme Court
The 1968 case of People v. Sluder'0

re-announced the rule

97. See 16 AM.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 94 (1964).
See, e.g., People v. Orndoff, 39 Ill. 2d 96, 233 N.E.2d 378 (1968).
See 16 AM. JuR. 2d ConstitutionalLaw § 93 (1964).
161 Ill. 497, 44 N.E. 984 (1896).
Id. at 501-02, 44 N.E. at 985.
See 16 AM. JuR. 2d ConstitutionalLaw § 98 (1964).
See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.

105. See 16 AM.

JUR.

2d ConstitutionalLaw § 94 (1964).

106. 161 Ill. 497, 502, 44 N.E. 984, 985.
107. 40 Ill. 2d 559, 240 N.E.2d 666 (1968).
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promulgated in People v. Elliot, 08 that where a penalty was
within the statutory limits prescribed for that offense, a contention that it was excessive did not raise a constitutional question. 10 9 Unfortunately, the case is still being cited for that proposition, 11 0 even though it is obvious that the court in Sluder was
using the provision of the 1870 Constitution in drawing its conclusion. As pointed out earlier, one of the significant changes
wrought by section 11 of the 1970 Constitution was that it was
aimed specifically at the judicial as well as the legislative branch.
Therefore, if it could be shown that the judge who imposed
the sentence disregarded the mandate of section 11, directing that
he take into consideration the offender's rehabilitation potential,
it would seem clear that a constitutional issue has been raised
even though the sentence was within statutory limits. Since
trial judges have always been deemed to be in a better position
to make discretionary judgments, the case alleging a breach of
discretion in sentencing would probably have to be clear-cut."'
If, however, the record reveals that a sentence was the result
of the prejudice of a judge, rather than of a consideration of
the factors prescribed by section 11, then it should be held to
' 12
be violative of the defendant's constitutional right.
108. 272 Ill. 592, 112 N.E. 300 (1916).
109. Id. at 600, 112 N.E. at 304.
110. E.g., People v. Rife, 18 Ill. App. 3d 602, 610, 310 N.E.2d 179, 185-

86 (1974).
111. A trial court judge's discretion, although respected, is by no
means sacred and the Supreme Court of Illinois will reverse when it concludes that an error in judgment has been made. See People v. Nuccio,
43 Ill. 2d 375, 253 N.E.2d 353 (1969), where defendant's conviction was
reversed and remanded because it appeared that the judge at defendant's
bench trial was unaware that evidence he was considering was incompetent. The presumption that a judge at a bench trial will, in his discretion, consider only competent evidence was overridden by the facts on
record.
112. In the case of People v. Smith, 98 Ill. App. 2d 406, 240 N.E.2d
462 (1968), the appellate court quoted that part of the record in which
the trial judge imposed the sentence. The defendant had been found
guilty of molesting a young boy and the trial judge made the following
statement upon imposition of sentence:
'I wish that the legislature had made the punishment even more severe than it is under this statute because I would be impelled by
my conscience and by my duty to impose a maximum sentence of
any number of years that the statute would permit me to do.
Now then, that being the case, from this evidence, beyond all reasonable doubt that this has happened, and we've got to take these fellows off the streets of this city or else we are going to run into this
problem at the time, and with an alert citizenry maybe we will get
rid of some of these criminals that go after these little children, the
little girls and little boys of our community, so they can live and
be as God intended they should, there will be a finding of guilty
in this case and the Court will impose a minimum sentence of two
hundred and thirty-eight months, a maximum sentence of twenty
years in the Illinois State Penitentiary, to be served at Menard. I
will so direct in the pen letter. I will enter judgment on the finding
first. Menard Penitentiary where we perhaps can take care of these
people.
I will further direct that one month out each year, being the month
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Post-Conviction Hearings

Proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act are
available to any person who asserts that "in the proceedings
which resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial
of his rights under the Constitution of the United States or of
1 4
the
113 In People v. Pier,
the State of Illinois or both ....
his
right
that
petition
post-conviction
defendant contended in his
to due process had been violated because his admission of a probation violation had been induced by the state's attorney's unful5'
The state confilled promise to recommend a lesser sentence."
tended that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act did not apply to
1 6
The court rethe review of probation revocation hearings.
jected the state's contention on the basis that "conviction" as
117
The court
used in the Act included imposition of sentence.
concluded:
Under this definition a defendant may raise in a post-conviction
petition issues of a constitutional dimension that occurred not
only in the proceeding which involved the determination of his
guilt, but also those which arose in proceedings concerning the
imposition of the sentence. 118
Accordingly, if a defendant can show that his right under section 11 was violated in the proceedings concerning imposition of
his sentence, the procedures of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
are available to him.
The Illinois Supreme Court has held, without elaboration,
that when "the sentence is within the statutory limits . . . the
allegation of excessiveness raises no issue cognizable under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act."" 9 Although this would seem to
close the door as to issues concerning excessiveness as grounds
for post-conviction proceedings, it is possible that the court,
of October, when this crime occurred, that he shall be confined to
solitary confinement during that month of each year that he is there
so that he can meditate on what he attempted to do to this three
and a half year old boy. And maybe some day he may come out
of the penitentiary and know that these crimes do not go unpunished
and that his conscience should trouble him at least one month out
of each year.'
98 Ill. App. 2d at 412-13, 240 N.E.2d at 465-66. The appellate court found
that the sentence imposed was not "clearly free from the implication of
being the result of prejudice on the part of the court." The court reduced
the sentence to 10 to 20 years and removed the required periods of solitary confinement. Id. at 416, 290 N.E.2d at 465. The case illustrates the
type of situation which the framers presumably had in mind when they
drafted the constitutional mandate of section 11.
113. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 (1973).
114. 51 Ill. 2d 96, 281 N.E.2d 289 (1972).
115. Id. at 97, 281 N.E.2d at 289.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 98, 281 N.E.2d at 290.
118. Id.
119. People v. Ballinger, 53 Ill. 2d 388, 390, 292 N.E.2d 400, 401 (1973).
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which probably was applying the reasoning of the Sluder case
discussed above, might be persuaded to change its position if it
would accept the propositions that section 11 is self-executing
and was intended to bind the judicial as well as the legislative
branch.
In the case of People v. Scott, 120 the supreme court held that
an allegation that the defendant had not received a hearing in
aggravation and mitigation, in violation of his statutory right,
did not raise a constitutional issue cognizable under the PostConviction Hearing Act. 1 2 1 The defendant might have been able
to effectively raise a constitutional question had he argued that
section 11 was self-executing, and that the failure of the judge
to consider factors relating to rehabilitation, as evidenced by the
lack of a hearing in mitigation, was a breach of his constitutional
right.
The closest that a court has come to recognizing section 11
as a means of raising a constitutional question, which is required
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, was dicta in the case
of People v. Rife,1 22 where the court stated:
It appears that the only way this court could act on the
sentence issue would be to find that the 20 to 50 year sentence
imposed was so excessive as to be cruel and unusual punishment
for the offense of burglary and perhaps in conflict with the 1970
constitutionalmandate (art. I, sec. 11) that sentences be set with
the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship as
a constitutional
well as according to the offense, thus raising
123
question requiringa post-conviction hearing.
The court, however, found itself bound by People v. Sluder and
applied the outmoded rule that if the sentence is within the statutory prescription, an allegation of excessiveness raises no consti1 24
tutional issue.
As long as the courts continue to uphold the rule promulgated by People v. Elliot' 2 5 in 1916, that a sentence within statutory limits cannot be attacked as unconstitutional without attacking the statute itself, it is apparent that allegations of excessive or harsh sentences will not be held to raise constitutional
issues sufficient to meet the requirement of the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act. In view of the intent of the drafters of section
11 to bind the judiciary, the rule of People v. Elliot should be
modified or abolished so as to allow section 11 to operate in the
manner intended. Until such time, the intent of the framers of
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

49 Ill. 2d 231, 274 N.E.2d 39 (1971).
Id. at 233-34, 274 N.E.2d at 40.
18 Ill. App. 3d 602, 310 N.E.2d 179 (1974).
Id. at 610, 310 N.E.2d at 185-86 (emphasis added).
Id., 310 N.E.2d at 186.

125. 272 111. 592, 112 N.E. 300 (1916).
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section 11 to place constitutional limitations on punitive-minded
judges will not receive the constitutional protection which it
deserves.
LEGISLATIVE ACTION
As was noted earlier, in the investigation of the intent of
the framers of section 11, the delegates contemplated implementation of the new language concerning rehabilitation, through
legislation and rules of court consonant with the aim of the new
language. The Uniform Code of Corrections, 12 6 which became
effective on January 1, 1973, lists its purposes in the following
manner:
(a) prescribe sanctions proportionate to the seriousness of the
offenses and permit the recognition of differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders;
(b)

forbid and prevent the commission of offenses;

(c) prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons adjudicated offenders or delinquents; and
127
(d) restore offenders to useful citizenship.
It is obvious from the declaration of such purposes that this
legislation was an attempt by the legislative branch to meet the
mandate of section 11. Generally, the Code would seem, statutorily, to have been successful because, as one commentator has
noted, it
urges a greater utilization of the full range of sentencing dispositions-imprisonment, periodic imprisonment (work release),
probation, conditional discharge, and imposition of a fine-with
an eye toward fashioning an efficacious and economical sanction
that will provide society with protection 128
and the offender
with a reasonable probability of rehabilitation.
The most salient feature of the new Code is its classification
of offenses into categories.129 The dual purpose of such classification is apparently to assist the legislature in creating an
ordered system of offenses by seriousness, and to simplify the
sentencing choices which a judge must make in criminal cases.' 30
It is hoped that such classifications will result in more even3
handed justice and eliminate disparity of sentencing.1
126.
127.
128.
B.J. 62
129.

REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1001-1 et seq. (1973).
Id. at § 1001-1-2.
Pusatri & Scott, Illinois' New Unified Code of Corrections, 61 ILL.
(1972).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-1 (1973).

ILL.

130. S.H.A. ch. 38, (Council Commentary for Div. X of the Uniform
Code of Corrections, 1973).
131. Id.
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Also new under the Uniform Code of Corrections are the
pre-sentencing procedures set out in article 3 of chapter 5,132
which provide that every defendant has a right to a pre-sentence
investigation before sentencing unless knowingly waived by him
or ordered by the court despite such waiver. 133 The investigation
must be presented in written form13 4 and contain information
concerning defendant's physical, mental and criminal histories,
family situation, economic status, education, occupation and personal habits. 13 5 The report should also contain any other information about special resources that might assist in defendant's
rehabilitation, including all the various rehabilitative programs
to which defendant might be committed. The provision requiring written reports is significant since it helps courts of review
make determinations on the questions of whether, on the facts
available to him, the sentencing judge violated the constitutional
directive of section 11.
Article 4 of chapter 5 of the Code1 3 6 is entitled "Sentencing"
and sets out the procedures by which penalties will be imposed.
This new section makes it clear that a hearing in aggravation
and mitigation is mandatory whether requested or not, and sets
out all the considerations the court shall hear before setting sentence.'3 7 One of these considerations is, of course, the pre-sentence report. The prior requirement of having the judge set the
138
sentence is carried over.
This section of the Code is important because it statutorily
requires that a judge receive all the evidence that he could possibly use to determine the possibilities of restoring the offender
to useful citizenship. Such a requirement is probably the closest
the legislature can come to complying with the intent behind
section 11.
Finally, with regard to the objective of rehabilitation, the
Code takes recognition of the fact that the offender who is forced
to serve out his full term has most likely been the type of offender most resistant to any attempts to rehabilitate him. Therefore, the Code provides that every offender will be subject to
a period of parole after release." 39 Such a requirement is consonant with the objective of section 11, since in many cases the
time just following release may be the most critical in terms of
returning the offender to useful citizenship.
132. ILL. REV.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

STAT.

ch. 38, § 1005-3-1 et seq. (1973).

Id. § 1005-3-1.
Id.
Id. § 1005-3-2.
Id. § 1005-4-1 et seq.
Id. § 1005-4-1(a).
Id. § 1005-4-1(b).
Id. § 1005-8-1 (e).
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Only those significant features of the Code which pertain to
sentencing have been discussed here. The new Uniform Code
of Corrections, as a whole, would appear not only to have clarified prior statutes and grouped them for easier reference, but
also to have been drafted with the constitutional mandate that
penalties should be prescribed with the view of returning the
offender to useful citizenship, firmly in mind.
CONCLUSION

In the 1960's, the legislature shifted the delegation of the
power to determine the precise period of imprisonment, within
statutory limits, from the jury, supposedly a body of reasonable
men, to one man, the trial court judge. Recognizing the possibility that a judge might be unable to separate his own personal
prejudice from the legislatively-announced goals of imprisonment, the delegates to the 1970 Constitutional Convention sought
to create a constitutional safeguard. The framers of section 11
realized that, to be effective, such a safeguard would have to
directly limit the types of considerations constitutionally allowable when a judge imposes a sentence.
The burden of establishing tests and standards to be applied
in the determination of whether a judge has acted outside the
constitutional limitations of section 11 rests with the reviewing
courts of Illinois. The task is of monumental difficulty since it
involves the entirely subjective factors of each offender's possibility of rehabilitation and of each judge's motives in setting
a sentence. Nonetheless, the people of Illinois have determined
that the goal of imprisonment should be to return the offender
to useful citizenship. The judiciary therefore has a duty to see
that this objective, rather than the satisfaction of the biases of a
judge, is sought upon imposition of sentence.
The first step towards the fulfillment of this duty is the recognition that section 11 creates a new constitutional right and
that a defendant raises a question of constitutional dimensions
when he alleges violations of it. Once the importance of section
11 as a constitutional right is realized, the procedural machinery
of appellate review and post-conviction hearings will begin to
attempt to solve the problem of applicable standards. Until it
is held that the allegation that a judge has breached the constitutional limitation placed on him by section 11 raises a constitutional question, the substantive right of section 11 will lie
dormant.
Implementation and protection of rights, constitutionally reserved to the people in their grant of sovereignty to the govern-
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ment, has always been a major function of the judicial branch.
The Illinois Constitution of 1970 reserved a new right, that of
having penalties determined with the offender as well as the offense in mind. The judicial system of Illinois must now proceed
to protect and implement that right.
Roy W. Hardin

